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Teaching can teach us a lot

In a recent Commentary, Byrne and Rapaport (2011; henceforth B & R) question the value of the functional perspective on teaching in nonhuman animals in understanding the basis of teaching in humans. They argue that the established operational definition of teaching by Caro & Hauser (1992; henceforth C & H) is overly restrictive, misses instances where teaching serves to correct individual failings in slow learners, and inhibits progress in our understanding of the cognitive underpinnings of human teaching. While we welcome increased focus on the cognitive foundations of teaching, this need not come at the costs of reducing rigour in this nascent field. Here, we mount a defence of the C & H definition and argue that it can be applied at both population and individual levels. We suggest that the development of the field will best be served by considering both whether teaching occurs and, if so, how it is achieved.
Is it Teaching?
A rigorous definition is necessary to distinguish teaching from other forms of behaviour. From an evolutionary perspective, much of the interest in teaching arises because it is a specialised form of cooperation, whereby knowledgeable individuals invest in helping others to learn (Thornton & Raihani 2008). Caro & Hauser’s (1992) operational definition is critical in allowing us to discriminate such active assistance from cases of inadvertent social learning, where individuals acquire information from others who are simply going about their usual business and attempting to maximise their own immediate benefits. This parallels the distinction between cooperative behaviour that involves initial investments and is selected for its beneficial effects on recipients, and by-product mutualism, where the self-serving actions of one individual inadvertently benefit another (Clutton-Brock 2002; West et al. 2007). The C & H definition has been enormously productive, spurring on a previously moribund area of research and setting the scene for empirical (Thornton & Raihani 2008; Hoppitt et al. 2008) and theoretical analyses (Riboli-Sasco et al. 2008; Fogarty et al. 2011), with impacts felt in evolutionary biology, anthropology and psychology (e.g. Tehrani & Riede 2008; Thornton & Raihani 2008; Hrdy 2009; Shettleworth 2010a). Nevertheless, B & R argue that strict adherence to the definition risks neglecting certain cases and, critically, that many instances of human teaching would be excluded.  
	In fact, we argue that, by placing the emphasis on measurable parameters, the C & H definition does rather a good job of capturing a diverse range of teaching interactions. The definition is divided into three main criteria: a knowledgeable individual (1) changes its behaviour in the presence of a naïve companion in a way that (2) provides no immediate benefit, or imposes short-term costs, but (3) causes the companion to learn. In fact, the two cases B & R present as examples of the definition’s failure to capture “unambiguous cases” of human teaching fit the criteria perfectly. In the first example, an Aché father (1) modifies his usual behaviour when crafting a bow by calling his son over, choosing a wide seat to accommodate the son and shifting his position periodically to allow the son a better view. These subtle behavioural changes (2) provide no current benefits to the father relative to his usual bow-making when alone, and may well slow down the process. Finally, (3) the son learns a skill he may not have learned otherwise. In the second example, a school teacher (1) writes cursive on the blackboard in a classroom full of children and moulds the hand of a particularly poor pupil. This behaviour (2) is time consuming and provides no immediate benefits to the teacher, but (3) the children all learn something they would not have done otherwise, with the poor pupil perhaps showing particular improvements due to the extra attention he receives. B & R are particularly concerned that in some cases the costs of teaching may be minimal and have no measurable impact on energy budgets. However, this issue is not as damaging to the C & H approach as they imply. The critical point is that there is no current benefit: the teachers’ changes to their usual routine serve no purpose other than to help others to learn. Thus, the C & H definition may not be as restrictive as B & R assume.
Nevertheless, there will clearly be genuine cases of teaching for which it proves difficult to generate unequivocal evidence. Indeed, we have previously made the point that, because of these difficulties, we currently underestimate the prevalence of teaching (Thornton & McAuliffe 2006; Thornton & Raihani 2008), and we have provided numerous suggestions as to methodologies that might improve data collection (Thornton & Raihani 2010). With the field as it currently stands, it is important to consider how we may treat cases where the evidence is suggestive but inconclusive. B & R provide no alternative standards by which to judge whether one individual goes out of its way to help another to learn and, in a curious reversal of Occam’s razor, suggest that it may be productive to grant ambiguous cases the benefit of the doubt until teaching is disproven. We feel that moving away from clearly delineated and testable definition risks creating confusion and eroding standards of evidence in this nascent field. Moreover, there is a serious risk of inadvertently setting up a double standard, whereby special dispensation of weak evidence is granted to certain species simply by virtue of their large brains, presumed cognitive sophistication or phylogenetic proximity to humans. For instance, given inconclusive evidence for teaching from, say, a fish and a primate, there may be a danger that the latter evidence may be treated more generously, and that the underlying mechanisms may be assumed by default to be more complex. Similar concerns have been raised by other comparative researchers (e.g. Chittka & Niven 2009; Laland & Hoppitt 2003) and may be partly assuaged by adhering to carefully defined, measurable criteria. Rather than abandoning rigour, it is more productive to present inconclusive evidence for teaching with due caution and consideration for alternative explanations. Such cases can undoubtedly contribute to our growing understanding of teaching and will help to spur further research. However, there is little to be gained from accepting equivocal evidence for teaching uncritically if simpler explanations that do not require the active participation of knowledgeable individuals cannot be ruled out.

Sensitive Teachers	
	As B & R rightly point out, population-level analyses, such as those employed in accepted cases of teaching in tandem-running ants, pied babblers and meerkats (Franks & Richardson 2006; Raihani & Ridley 2008; Thornton & McAuliffe 2006 respectively), may not capture instances where particularly sensitive teachers act to bring slow learners up to speed. This is not, however, a reason to abandon the operational definition, but instead should lead us to consider how best to test it, and to determine the level at which to conduct our analyses. The most direct route is to experimentally withhold or increase teaching for certain pupils and measure the impacts (Thornton & Raihani 2010). Experiments may also serve not only to establish the occurrence of teaching, but also to document the extent to which teachers are sensitive to their pupils’ needs. For instance, by interrupting bouts of teaching and experimentally inhibiting the capacity of pupils to learn, researchers have shown that knowledgeable tandem-running ants evaluate the progress of their pupils and adjust their movements accordingly (Richardson et al. 2007; Franklin et al. 2011). Where experiments are unfeasible, careful analyses of observational data can also be highly informative. In population-level studies, the potential impacts of individual variability may often be accounted through the use of mixed-effects models controlling for repeated measures of individuals. Where there is strong reason to suspect that teachers show sensitivity to individual pupils’ competence, within-subjects analyses would allow us to detect improvements in individual pupils’ skills relative to teachers’ investments. Further analyses could determine the impact of putative teachers by comparing learning by poor pupils that do or do not receive extra assistance. Thus, in B & R’s schoolteacher example, population-level analyses of the C & H criteria would reveal overall improvements in the children’s cursive skills in relation to their attendance of cursive lessons, and certainly relative to children that did not attend lessons. Similarly, at an individual level, we could compare the poor pupil’s skills before and after lessons and measure his learning trajectory relative to unschooled pupils of the same age. 

Cognitive Mechanisms of Teaching
One of B & R’s principal concerns is that the focus on the function of teaching detracts from our understanding of its cognitive foundations. However, adherence to a rigorous operational definition based on evolutionary function does not in any way preclude analysis of cognitive mechanisms. Indeed, it is very difficult to understand the mechanisms by which one individual helps another to learn if we do not, in fact, know that that is indeed what it is doing.
From a psychological perspective, much of the interest in teaching stems from the fact that much (though not all) of human teaching involves recognising that a given individual lacks knowledge or skills, allowing flexible, targeted teaching across contexts. However, it is important to note that skill monitoring may be achieved through a number of different mechanisms. In many cases, responses to physical or behavioural cues may suffice for teaching to be targeted appropriately. Adult meerkats, for instance, respond to age-related changes in pups’ begging calls, presenting dead or disabled prey to young pups and live prey to old pups. They also monitor individual pups handling prey and will intervene by recapturing or modifying prey if a pup is having difficulty (Thornton & McAuliffe 2006). Similarly, tandem-running ants use tactile cues to ensure that teachers and pupils respond sensitively to one another’s movements, thus facilitating learning (Franks & Richardson 2006; Richardson et al. 2007; Franklin et al. 2011). These findings provide a powerful illustration of the power of simple mechanisms in generating seemingly complex behaviour. Such low-level mechanisms are increasingly recognised as having great importance in both human and non-human behaviour (Shettleworth 2010b) and their role in human teaching ought not to be underestimated. This is particularly true for cases such as scaffolding (parental support and encouragement of infant motor skill development) and motherese (simplified, exaggerated parental speech to facilitate infant language learning), both of which, like all known examples of non-human teaching, are adaptations to promote learning in specific contexts (Thornton & Raihani 2008).
Of course, it would be fascinating to know whether any non-human animal goes beyond stimulus-response mechanisms and, like humans, is also motivated by a strong desire to share intentions and equipped with the ability to attribute knowledge and recognise ignorance (Tomasello et al. 2005). However, diluting the definition of teaching will not take us any closer to understanding such motivational and cognitive traits. B & R suggest that a focus on rare cases where teaching is reserved for special instances to assist slow learners will be particularly informative about the evolution of human targeted instruction. We have previously argued that if selection favours teaching because it is necessary to promote learning of critical skills, it should be common within populations (Thornton & Raihani 2008). Indeed, all human children need to be taught, even if slow learners receive special instruction. Nevertheless, we concede that a species equipped with the ability to identify slow learners and target them for special instruction might be seen to teach relatively rarely. We agree that such cases of rare teaching may be of great value in understanding the cognitive foundations of human teaching, but only if (a) we can determine that teaching is occurring and (b) we specifically investigate the cognitive mechanisms involved. If we find that an animal seems to teach, albeit infrequently, this tells us little about whether this is a case of ‘intentional’ or ‘targeted’ instruction, rather than a response to behavioural cues. For example, B & R cite a recent study showing that adult female elephants occasionally simulate oestrus, apparently in an attempt to demonstrate to young relatives experiencing their first oestrus how to behave towards males (Bates et al. 2010). The jury must remain out on whether this is a case of teaching (eight of the 19 cases of false oestrus occurred when there were no young, first-oestrus females around to act as potential pupils) but even if we accept this explanation, the mechanisms by which matriarchs may or may not recognise “those few youngsters who really needed the help” are unknown. For instance, mature females may respond to behavioural indicators of the youngsters’ incompetence (as in meerkats) or false oestrus could simply be a non-adaptive by-product of hormonal changes, as has been found in chimpanzees (Elder &Yerkes 1936), orangutans (Schultz 1938) and gibbons (Barelli et al. 2007). We argue it may be more productive to determine whether elephants teach and then to design experiments to test how they do it.
While we share B & R’s desire to further our understanding of the evolution of human teaching, we do not agree that a reliance on the C & H definition to detect cases of teaching in nature risks hindering this enterprise. Instead, we suggest that the quest to understand the origins human teaching will best be served through two parallel lines of research. First, we can use the C & H definition to determine if an animal teaches and then examine how it does so. Second, as many comparative researchers are already doing, we can examine the domain-general mechanisms employed in some forms of human teaching. 
	The C & H criteria allow us to detect cases of teaching in nature, paving the way for experimental studies to investigate the mechanisms employed. Comparing the similarities and differences in the mechanisms used by human and non-human teachers will be crucial in understanding the evolution of distinctly human attributes. Moreover, adherence to the C & H definition when searching for animals that teach does not prevent us from examining whether the domain-general mechanisms employed in some forms of human teaching also occur in other species. Many of the mechanisms involved in human teaching are also deployed in a range of other situations. Consequently, comparative studies seeking to understand the evolutionary origins of these mechanisms do not necessarily have to occur in the context of teaching, or use species that are known to teach. For example, experimental studies of joint attention, theory of mind, imitation, causal reasoning and mental time travel in great apes, corvids and other animals for which there is no evidence of teaching are nevertheless crucial in helping us understand the evolution of cognitive traits that humans incorporate into much of their teaching. As a parallel, monkeys cannot talk, but studies examining their ability to represent hierarchically structured social relations (Seyfarth et al. 2005) or form semantic combinations (Arnold & Zuberbühler 2006) may provide useful insights into precursors of language.

Conclusions
The C & H definition provides us with the means to document teaching across a range of taxa and to unravel the selective pressures that may lead individuals, including humans, to invest in helping others to learn. We full heartedly agree with B & R that a focus on the cognitive mechanisms of teaching, with analyses of individuals as well as populations should be a priority for future research. However, far from stifling cognitive research, the C & H definition allows us to determine whether teaching occurs in a given species and, if so, to examine the underlying mechanisms. Moreover, productive experimental studies of the mechanisms involved in human teaching can proceed in animals that are not known to teach. Eroding standards of evidence in studies of teaching will take us no closer to understanding mechanisms, but may muddy the waters and hinder future progress.
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